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CURRENT DECISIONS
quantitative concept.26 What may appear too vague as to one subject
may be definite as to anotherY To the minds of some courts, the criti-
cized statutory word or phrase has a well-recognized or common mean-
ing.28 It also may be determined that the challenged portion has a defi-
nite and well-settled meaning in the common law.29 In the light of the
fact that the more recent decisions have held "vagrancy" statutes un-
constitutional, and with the Supreme Court giving greater force and
effect to concepts of equal justice 30 it is probable that courts in the
future will look more rigorously at these statutes in determining their
constitutionality. However, the Supreme Court has yet to decide the
validity of "vagrancy" statutes.31 Until such a case is decided, the courts
are relatively free to construe these statutes with their own notions of
"vagueness" and "indefinitiveness."
Criminal Law and Procedure-ELETRoNIC EAVESDROPPING. In
Katz v. United States,' petitioner was charged with transmitting wager-
ing information by telephone in violation of a federal statute.2 Over
26. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (dissenting opinion).
27. Id., at 525.
28. Id.; Phillips v. Municipal Ct., 24 Cal. App. 2d 453, 75 P.2d 548 (1938); State v.
Harlowe, 174 Wash. 227, 24 P.2d 601 (1933); McNeilly v. State, 119 N.J.L. 237, 195
A. 725 (Sup. Ct. 1937); See People v. Bell, 204 Misc. 71, 74, 125 N.Y.S.2d 117, 119 (Nas-
sau County Cr.), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 110, 115 N.E.2d 821 (1953); People v. Sohn, 269 N.Y.
330, 333, 199 N.E. 501, 502 (1936); Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Con-
dition, 66 HARv. L. Rzv. 1203 (1953); contra, United States v. Margeson, 259 F. Supp.
256 (1966), where the court stated, in discussing the meaning of "good account,"
that "the New Jersey courts have not defined it, and we must confess that to
us it is insufficiently precise to pass muster under the 14th Amendment." Contra,
People v. Diaz, 4 N.Y.2d 469, 151 NE.2d 871 (3rd Cir. 1958), where the court felt that
while the word "loiter" had acquired a common and accepted meaning, it did not, by
itself, inform a citizen of its criminal application and was left open to arbitrary en-
forcement.
29. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926); contra, Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507, 519 (1948).
30. For a discussion of the dangers of disorderly conduct statutes vis-a-vis our
changing social times, see Watts, Disorderly Conduct Statutes in Our Changing Society,
9 W. & M. L. Rv. 349 (1967).
31. Hicks v. District of Columbia, 197 A.2d 154 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 252 (1966).
1. 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (Supp. MI, 1958). That statute provides in part:
(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering know-
ingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate
or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the
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his objection the Government was allowed to introduce evidence of the
petitioner's end of telephone conversations overheard by FBI agents as
they monitored an electronic listening and recording device attached
to the outside of the public telephone booth from which the petitioner
had placed his calls.3
In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court held that since the
surveillance in question had not received the antecedent justification of
a duly authorized magistrate,4 this "search and seizure" I on the part
of the FBI was unreasonable and therefore a violation of the petitioner's
rights under the Fourth Amendment.6
The first case to reach the Supreme Court involving the Fourth
Amendment's applicability to eavesdropping through a wiretap was
Olmstead v. United States,7 in which Olmstead and others were con-
victed of conspiring to violate the National Prohibition Act. Evidence
essential to their conviction had been obtained by wiretap of private tele-
phones, and on this basis Olmstead contended that his right under the
Fourth Amendment had been violated. The Court rejected this con-
tention on three grounds: first, that the Fourth Amendment protected
persons against the search and seizure of tangibles but not intangibles
placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the
transmission of a wire communication which entitles the recepient to receive
money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting
in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the transmission
in interstate or foreign commerce of information for use in news reporting
of sporting events or contests, or for the transmission of information as-
sisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from
a State where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State
in which such betting is legal.
3. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1966).
4. See, Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 330 (1966); Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41, 51 (1961).
5. The Supreme Court has held that intangibles such as oral statements can be
"searched and seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Irvine v. Cali-
fornia, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (dictum); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41, 51 (1966); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).
6. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
7. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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such as conversation; second, that the Fourth Amendment applies only
to physical trespass; and third, that Olmstead intended that his conver-
sation be projected outside the privacy of his home." Further develop-
ment of constitutional law regarding eavesdropping was retarded by the
enactment of the Federal Comunications Act9 and the Court's interpre-
tation of section 605 of this law to bar further wiretapping by federal
agents.10 It was not, therefore, until the development of electronic
listening and recording devices that the question was raised once more."
Although subsequent decisions involving the use of electronic eaves-
dropping devices have been based on Olmstead, ironically they have
tended to erode its holding. The first Olmstead criterion to be rejected
was the requirement that the eavesdropped individual must have in-
tended that his voice be projected outside the private area within which
he spoke.12 The proposition that the Fourth Amendment protects only
against the unreasonable search and seizure of tangibles was the next
Olmstead criterion to be undermined.' 3 By implication, the Court in
Silverman v. United States14 held that the interception of conversation
reasonably intended to be private could constitute a "search and seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.; The Silverman Court
8. Id. at 464-465.
9. 47 U.S.C. Sec. 605 (1934).
10. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937).
11. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
12. In Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), the petitioners were convicted
of conspiring to violate the National Bankruptcy Act. They had schemed to retain
a secret profit on the sale of a debtor's estate. By the use of a detectaphone placed
against the outside of a partition wall, government agents had been able to overhear
incriminating conversations among the petitioners. The Court refused to distinguish
Goldman from Olmstead on the basis that in Olmrstead there was an intention to project
the voice outside the room, whereas in Goldman the conversations were intended to
remain within. By implication then the "intention" criterion was disposed of as the
Court used the other two Ohnstead criteria for deciding the case. They held that the
government eavesdrop was not within the Fourth Amendment because there had been
no physical trespass, and a conversation by definition does not meet the tangibility
requirement.
13. This proposition was attacked first in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954)
(dictum); and Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); and subsequently
in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 at 485 (1963); Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41 at 51 (1966); and Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).
14. 365 US. 505, 511 (1961).
15. The Silverman Court held that there had been trespass within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, but the facts show that nothing but the petitioners' conver-
sations were "searched and seized" (electronic eavesdropping). Still the Court held
that the petitioners' rights under the Fourth Amendment had been violated. The
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also relaxed the trespass requirement to a great extent. 6 Thus the only
element of the Olmstead holding being even moderately followed was
physical trespass. Following Silverman, the Court reduced the trespass
requirement to a mere formality in Clinton v. Virginia," holding inad-
missible evidence obtained through the use of an electronic eavesdrop-
ping device which had been fastened to the outside of a partition wall
by penetration no greater than that of a thumb tack. 8
Having established by its holding in Silverman that a conversation
could be subject to a "search and seizure," the Court in Osborn v. United
States19 determined that under sufficiently "precise and discriminate"'
circumstances2 a federal court may empower government agents to use
concealed electronic equipment to eavesdrop.21 However, this was quali-
fied in Berger v. New York,22 in which the Court held void on its face
a New York statute23 which authorized wiretapping based on warrants
issued by magistrates on a showing of probable cause, stating that the
statute lacked the necessary particularization to make it constitutional.2 4
By its holding in Katz v. United States25 the Court has removed the
Court has made subsequent exception to the Silverman holding that interception of
conversation reasonably intended to be private constitutes a "search and seizure." In
Lanza v. United States, 370 U.S. 139 at 143 (1962) it held that a jail is not a "constitution-
ally protected area" (although they failed to describe what a constitutionally protected
area is); hence, conversations therein even though intended private, are not protected
by the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); On Lee
v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Lopez
v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
16. In Silverman, police had inserted a "spike-mike" several inches into a party wall
so that it touched a heating duct which acted as a gigantic microphone enabling
police to hear conversations throughout the petitioner's house. The Court, recognizing
the technical distinctions involved, nevertheless held that this penetration was trespass
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 365 U.S. at 512.
17. 377 U.S. 158 (1964), rev'g per curiam 204 Va. 275, 130 S.E.2d 437 (1963). The
per curiam reversal was based on the Silverman rationale.
18. Clinton v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 275, 281-282, 130 S.E.2d 437, 442 (1963).
19. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
20. "A detailed factual affidavit alleging the commission of a specific criminal offense
directly and immediately affecting the administration of justice" was held to satisfy
the requirement. Id. at 330.
21. Id. at 329-330.
22. 388 U.S. 41 (1966).
23. N.Y. CODE OF CR. PROC., Sec. 813-a.
24. The New York statute laid down no requirement for particularity in the warrant
as to what specific crime had been or was being committed, nor did it require that
the places to be searched or the things or persons to be seized be described as specifically
required by the Fourth Amendment. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 at 55-59 (1966).
25. 88 S. St. 507 (1967).
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final obstacle which had prevented eavesdropping from coming com-
pletely within the purview of the Fourth Amendment. Applying Ber-
ger, the Court held that no physical trespass was necessary to violate
the petitioner's rights under the Fourth Amendment, since "the Fourth
Amendment protects people not places." 26 As the FBI had not received
prior judicial authorization for their "search and seizure," evidence
gained thereby was in violation of the Fourth Amendment and therefore
inadmissible. 27
The combined effect of Katz and Berger should be far reaching. No
longer will police or government agents be able to introduce evidence
gained by the use of sophisticated electronic eavesdropping equipment
without having been given antecedent judicial authority. Before Katz
it was conceivable that agents operating a great distance from a victim's
office or home could have eavesdropped his conversations therein
without being guilty of a "trespass." 28 In the light of Katz and Berger,
evidence gained in such a subtle manner will be inadmissible in the ab-
sence of proper antecedent judicial authority even though no physical
trespass is involved.
26. Mr. Justice Black entered a rather strong dissent. He agrees that the ends
reached by the Court are desirable but cannot justify the majority's liberal construction
of the Fourth Amendment. Katz v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 507 at 518 (1967) (dis-
senting opinion). It is Mr. Justice Black's contention that the Fourth Amendment ap-
plies to tangibles but not intangibles such as conversation which to his mind cannot
be "searched and seized." Mr. Justice Black also maintains that one cannot describe
with particularity future conversations which by their very nature are nonexistent. Id.
at 523.
27. The Katz Court went on to say that an individual is entitled to as much pro-
tection in a public phone booth as he is in an office, home or hotel room, since "wher-
ever a man may be he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable
searches and seizures." Id. at 515.
28. Parabolic microphones can intercept conversations held hundreds of yards away,
and other devices are available which enable an eavesdropper to overhear a conver-
sation taking place in a closed room by decoding the sound vibrations that pass through
a window therein. As to the future, acoustical engineers predict that it will be only
a short time before it is possible to utilize ultrasonic or electromagnetic waves to
penetrate any structural material for the purpose of overhearing conversations. See
generally S. DAsu, R. ScHwAaRTZ AND R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROppERS (1959); M.
BPTlroN, THE PRIVACY INvADERs (1964)
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